IC and Strategy as Practice: A Critical Examination

Dr. John Dumay
The University of Sydney
School of Business
Sydney NSW 2006, Australia
Email: john.dumay@sydney.edu.au

and

Professor James Guthrie
Macquarie University
Sydney NSW 2109, Australia
and
Bologna University
Bologna, Italy

Acknowledgements
The authors are pleased to acknowledge the comments, suggestions and advice received from several reviewers. Our thanks are also due to Fiona Crawford and Julz Stevens from Macquarie University for their editing and research assistance.
IC and Strategy as Practice: A Critical Examination

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper is to provide insights into, and a critique of, the relationship between IC and different approaches to strategy in developing competitive advantage in the knowledge economy. We examine the ‘practice’ of developing strategy to offer a different view on thinking about strategy from an IC lens, using the example of an Australian music school. The paper is novel because it analyses critically how IC can apply to developing strategy and how to implement IC strategically in practice. IC and strategy have been evolving along parallel paths, converging along the concept of practice. The paper contributes to both the literature on strategy and IC by concluding that, rather than being concerned with becoming an IC or strategy “practitioner”, we should be concerned with becoming “participants” involved in developing the future and thus better connect to praxis in the workplace.

Keywords: Strategy as practice, intellectual capital, strategy practitioners, praxis
1. STRATEGY FROM AN IC LENS

Developing a competitive advantage is seen as the 'Holy Grail' of business: eternally elusive yet continuously sought after. So while the search for the 'Holy Grail' continues, the world’s economy has undergone its biggest evolution since the industrial revolution, transitioning into what we know as the ‘knowledge’ or ‘information’ economy (Teece, 1998; Guthrie et al, 2000; Petty et al, 2001). In this ‘new’ economy, utilising knowledge and intangible assets is considered the heart of developing competitive advantage and thus economic value.

Popular views of traditional strategy developed during the industrial age (Ghemawat, 2002) and may have lost their relevance in the new economy. Therefore, if these strategies are applied in the wrong context, then rather than enhancing a firm’s chance of success, they may be detrimental. The purpose of this paper is to develop insights into and critique (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000) four popular strategic management frameworks taught in business schools (Teece et al, 1997; Ghemawat, 2002; Ricceri et al, 2010) and their applicability towards developing a competitive advantage in the ‘new’ economy. We consider this important because the link between strategy and intellectual capital (IC) is often overlooked by the concern for managing, measuring and reporting IC (Dumay & Rooney, 2011a).

The paper is novel because it critically analyses how these frameworks apply to developing strategy where the key resources are intangible. After the initial analysis we then examine how the ‘practice’ of developing strategy (Whittington, 1996; 2006) can draw on the insights and critique, and offer a different view on thinking about strategy from an IC lens using an illustration from our past research. This paper explores the use of strategy and IC using a case study approach. It focuses on a strategy planning and execution exercise undertaken by one of the authors in an Australian musical school. The study finds that rather than relying on expert IC or ‘strategy practitioners’ to construct and implement, it is important to expand this to include ‘strategy participants’ who live in the context of their workplace. The paper adds to the literature on understanding strategy as practised.
Before proceeding it is necessary to define IC because there is not one generally accepted definition of IC (Ricceri et al, 2012). However, Stewart's (1997, x) is used in this paper:

... the sum of everything everybody in a[n organisation] ... knows that gives it a competitive edge ... Intellectual Capital is intellectual material, knowledge, experience, intellectual property, information ... that can be put to use to create wealth [competitive advantage]

Here the focus is not just the sum of defined components, but rather the way that the components interact and work to create value for the organisation.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review through an IC lens of four dominant strategy frameworks (i.e., competitive forces; strategic conflict; resource based view; and dynamic capabilities approach). Section 3 briefly presents the theoretical lens for examining the transformation of IC into strategic practices. It also outlines the context of the research site of the Australian music school. Section 4 provides an analysis of the findings and Section 5 concludes the paper.

2. INSIGHTS INTO STRATEGY AND IC
Discussing strategy from an IC lens is useful because one of the reasons firms employ IC practices is to develop a competitive advantage over their rivals (Marr et al, 2003: 444). Also this is a fundamental purpose of strategic management (Teece et al, 1997). Thus, combing IC and strategy helps with understanding how IC practices contribute towards competitive advantage. Teece et al (1997: 510–1) identify four dominant strategy frameworks (i.e., competitive forces, strategic conflict, the resource based view of the firm, and the dynamic capabilities approach), which we will examine from an IC perspective. These have been chosen because they represent “a fairly linear development … into the efforts to understand the determinants of industry profitability and competitive position” (Ghemawat, 2002: 37).

2.1 COMPETITIVE FORCES
The competitive forces approach is known through Porter’s (1980) five forces framework with its origins in the economic sub-field known as “industrial organization”, which sought to explain “why some industries were more profitable
than others” (Ghemawat, 2002: 53). In the framework five industry level forces impinge on a firm’s ability to compete in an industry and to attain economic rents by impeding competitive forces. These forces are identified as entry barriers, threat of substitution, bargaining power of buyers, bargaining power of suppliers and rivalry among industry participants (Porter, 1980).

Here there is some recognition that specific intangible assets of a firm play a role in the competitive forces context, for example “brand identity” and the relational capital between buyers (customers), suppliers and the government. However, competitive forces are the main differentiating factors used to explain industry-level profits in a relatively stable competitive environment. But in the ‘new’ knowledge economy explaining competitive advantage is more complex because the impact of owning and deploying specific assets, in particular intangible assets, provides a clearer understanding of how firms attain profits (Teece, 1984). Thus, because the competitive forces approach helps explain strategy in stable operating environments it becomes less applicable today (Teece et al, 1997: 510).

**2.2 STRATEGIC CONFLICT**

The second strategic framework is based upon game theory using “the non-cooperative solution concept of Nash equilibrium or one of its refinements” (Shapiro, 1989: 125). Game theory advocates that firms make irreversible commitments that impact on the behaviour of their rivals and thus the market in which they operate. If a firm can manipulate events in its market it might gain a competitive advantage and thus above average profits (Teece et al, 1997: 510).

Game theory provides an understanding of business behaviour and the interactions between firms. However, game theory can be equally as confusing, as the results of game theory depend on the design and type of game played, the qualitative judgements made by participants, information asymmetries, and because many games have multiple equilibriums. Additionally, game theory has its limitations when one firm is dominant over its rivals or in oligopolies. In these cases the fortunes of competitors will be based on total market demand rather than the strategic deployment of firm specific assets (Teece et al, 1997).
From the IC perspective strategic conflict has some value. Chen (2003) advocates combining game theory with options pricing theory (Kossovsky, 2002) to assess the value of intangible assets and the strategic use of IC. For example, it can be used in deciding whether to protect or licence intellectual property (IP) as there may be financial benefits from entering into licensing and/or joint venture arrangements with supposed competitors (Klaila & Hall, 2000). In another example, allowing IP to be used openly may result in developing ‘network externalities’, whereby the value of a product or service increases with the amount of people using it. Mobile phones and the internet are relevant examples (Chen, 2003). West and Mace (2008: 280) explain in relation to the development of ‘apps’ that increase the iPhone’s utility:

The day before releasing the iPhone 3G, Apple also opened an online marketplace called the “iPhone App Store”. The store included about 500 free and commercial native applications, based on the software development kit that it released on March 6 [2008].

However, Teece et al (1997: 510) identify that game theory’s main limitation is that it examines how IC assets can be strategically deployed rather than concentrating on how these assets are created in the first place. Thus, they see a potential problem with managers who are so occupied with analysing and planning strategic moves that they lose sight of trying to develop more permanent forms of competitive advantage.

### 2.3 THE RESOURCE BASED VIEW

The resource based view (RBV) has become a popular strategic management perspective. Academics such as Wernerfelt (1984), Barney (1991), Dierickx and Cool (1989) and Grant (1991) have written about the benefits of examining firm resources rather than activities in the marketplace. However, the RBV is not opposed to the prior frameworks, but complements them, because the RBV examines what a firm has rather than what a firm does (Haanes & Fjeldstad, 2000; Viedma Marti, 2004). The RBV became popular in the 1990s because of Prahalad and Hamel’s (1990) *Harvard Business Review* article “The Core Competence of the Corporation” (Wernerfelt, 1995).

The RBV espouses that firms are more profitable because they are lower cost producers or deliver superior products and services to those of rivals. The RBV
theorises that competitive advantage is garnered by owning firm-specific resources rather than superior product market positioning. Competitive advantage thus lies in the ability to utilise distinctive and inimitable resources and capabilities which are ‘sticky’ in the short term because firms cannot easily change what they do or have (Teece et al, 1997). There are three reasons behind the ‘stickiness’. First, developing distinctive competences is complex; firms cannot develop new ones quickly (Dierickx & Cool, 1989). Second, many assets are difficult if not impossible to acquire, especially intangible assets (Teece, 1980; Dierickx & Cool, 1989). Third, when acquiring assets in an open market the price paid takes into account the fully capitalised rents flowing from the asset (Barney, 1986). Thus, from the RBV perspective, a firm must identify its unique resources, identify the market in which those resources are the most valuable, and decide on the best way of extracting the resources in the chosen market by either participating in the market, selling output or selling the assets (Teece et al, 1997).

Deciding which resources and capabilities contribute to competitive advantage is problematic because of the difficulty in imitating or substituting assets and capabilities due to what Dierickx and Cool (1989: 1508) refer to as “causal ambiguity”. Causal ambiguity exists because firms acquire resources randomly and are especially unsure of how or when investments in intangible resources will pay off. Dierickx and Cool (1989: 1508–9) use the analogy of comparing investing into research and development to putting money into a slot machine: firms who put more money into either will be ‘more likely’ to eventually hit the jackpot. Dierickx and Cool (1989: 1509) also outline the inability of firms to identify and/or control the resources essential to their distinctive competitive advantage. Thus, if a firm does not understand what drives its own competitive advantage it would be almost impossible for a competitor to imitate it because of the uncertainty about which combination of resources it should acquire (Lippman & Rumelt, 1982).

The RBV is aligned to IC by considering the managerial processes required for developing new intangible assets and capabilities. The RBV advocates utilising a firm’s distinctive and inimitable resources to generate competitive advantage; therefore managing these resources, which are mostly intangible, is important. Learning and skills acquisition become important strategic issues (Mouritsen et al,
2002). Also Teece et al (1997) identify the process of accumulating and managing intangible assets as having the greatest potential impact on developing future strategy.

2.4 DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES

The ‘dynamic capabilities’ framework builds on the RBV. Many companies have followed the RBV by acquiring technology assets and protecting their IP, but are still lacking capabilities required for developing competitive advantage. However, Teece et al (1997) observed that companies who are responsive to the market, innovate, and manage their competences have been the successes in the ‘new’ knowledge economy.

Developing new types of competitive advantage is at the heart of the ‘dynamic capabilities’ framework. ‘Dynamic’ refers to continually developing new competences aligned with a turbulent market environment. ‘Capabilities’ refers to adapting, integrating and reconfiguring the skills, resources and competences to market demands. Thus, the ability of firms to change in response to their environment makes the difference. Teece et al (1997: 518) argue “that the competitive advantage of the firm lies with its managerial and organisational processes, shaped by its (specific) asset position and, the paths available to it”.

When discussing the RBV, we identified the difficulty of identifying resources and competences that generated competitive advantage and thus made resources difficult to imitate. This makes the decision to invest in specific competences an important strategic decision (Dierickx & Cool, 1989) because doing so puts boundaries on the firm as to what its actions are today and in the future. As such, investments in specific competences become long-term irreversible ‘sticky’ commitments. Thus, deciding which paths to commit to and when to change direction is critical to a firm’s strategy (Teece et al, 1997).

The dynamic capabilities view of strategy aligns with IC because both are concerned with the process of developing intangible assets. Dynamic capabilities advocates leveraging assets for which no ready markets exist and these are the only assets of strategic interest. Assets purchased freely in the open market by any industry participant cannot be a source of competitive advantage. Thus, from a strategic IC viewpoint the assets which cannot be represented on the balance sheet are the most important to the firm (Teece et al, 1997).
3. FRAME AND DATA COLLECTION

3.1 TRANSFORMING IC AND STRATEGIC PRACTICE

IC and strategy have been developing along parallel paths and we argue they are converging along the concept of practice. Guthrie et al.’s (2012: 69) review of IC literature (2000–9) identified a third stage of IC research which “is emerging based on a critical and performative analysis of IC practices in action”. On the strategy side Whittington (1996; 2006: 732) identifies “a practice turn in current strategy research, treating strategy as something people do”. Thus, there is a convergence in the IC and strategy literatures emphasising practice rather than developing ostensive frameworks.

We also argue that organisational resources, management action and strategic practices are all ‘sticky’. As Whittington (2006: 620–1) explains, managers as strategy practitioners “draw upon the set of practices available from their” previous experiences and those congruent with other practitioners become internalised. For example, if the Balanced Scorecard is seen as a useful practice for developing IC and strategy it will become embedded practice. Thus, we would expect to see Balanced Scorecards being produced by strategy practitioners on a regular basis. Whittington calls the activity of making strategy praxis. Thus, inside organisations we have strategy practice and strategy practitioners combining to create “episodes of strategy praxis” (Whittington, 2006: 621).

The problem with many approaches taken in practice is that the fads and fashions used in the ‘new’ knowledge economy are often empirically unproven (Dumay, 2012) and at times have led to disastrous outcomes (Whittington, 2006: 624). For example, Whittington et al (2003: 401) outline how academic strategy gurus and practitioners were duped into espousing the success of Enron before its spectacular collapse. As Whittington et al (2003: 400) outline, Enron was seen as:

a strategy pioneer, vaunting its asset-light business model, the value of its intellectual capital, its adroit exploitation of deregulated markets, its innovativeness in Web-based commodity trading, and its atomization of the value chain. The company figured regularly among Fortune’s most admired companies.

Oppositely, different approaches to strategy and IC are advantageous because we can ‘choose from a large menu of ideas rather than from a small one’, which is especially
useful in the complex operating environment of the ‘new’ knowledge economy where “one size doesn’t fit all” (Ghemawat, 2002: 71). Indeed, both strategy and IC are ambiguous (Cuganesan et al, 2007) or ‘clay like’ and thus can be moulded to fit the situation at hand (Dumay and Rooney, 2011b) and internalised strategic practices (Whittington, 1996).

3.2 THE CASE STUDY: AMS

To illustrate how IC was used to transform strategy praxis we will use the example of developing strategy for the Australian Music School (AMS), a project which we completed in 2008. The AMS is interesting because it epitomises an organisation with outputs not measured in ‘profit’, yet still competing with other world class music schools for University resources and funding from donors, benefactors and bequests. However, music academics are unlikely to have acquired the skills for developing strategy and thus developing strategy was left to the Dean, senior managers and the AMS Board of Advice. These people are what Whittington (2006: 621) refers as a “set of strategy practitioners”.

A total of 28 academics and managers were interviewed or involved in the research and producing the strategy (Dumay et al, 2008). The participants were chosen because they represented a cross section of people impacted by, and involved in, changes in strategic direction. The research first developed an understanding of the AMS’s circumstances, using interviews and historical documents, followed by an extended period of staff involvement in developing strategy.

In the prior iteration strategy praxis, the practitioner driving its production was a semi-retired businessman with accounting qualifications, a former CFO of a major Australian company as well as a member of the board of directors of a major Australian based international company. Thus, it was not surprising to discover the resulting prior strategy document ended up as a rather thick report (over 150 pages), replete with graphs and tables of financial data and forecasts. The strong accounting

---

focused strategy was the result of strategy practitioners’ reliance on “established strategizing routines” (Whittington, 2006: 621).

When the prior strategy was implemented, the strategy practitioners discovered that AMS staff were not satisfied with, or had no involvement with, strategy development resulting in little ownership of the strategy. This is evidenced by the following comments from AMS staff when asked about their perception of the prior strategy:

This suggests close familiarity with the strategy. Most people don’t have this, including me.

If you had provided a strategy document to read and then asked these questions it would make sense.

…but I can’t answer… until I have read the strategic document.

Thus the strategy practitioners recognised the need to bring in external strategy practices and, in this case, they sought to utilise the expertise of one of the authors in linking IC to strategic outcomes. This combination we will call the ‘strategy team’. As a result a new strategy relying less on budgets and accounting outcomes was developed by linking the key intangible strategic aspects of the AMS with the desire to raise its profile as a world class music school.

4. FINDINGS

As Whittington (2006: 622) outlines, when a new strategy practice is introduced into an organisation it does not supplant the old practices, but rather complements them by being “accepted as useful and legitimate, solidifying into a new recurrent practice among this set of practitioners”. In the AMS case the team were able to select relevant IC related aspects of the strategic approaches and adapt these into the AMS’s strategy and still maintain necessary “accounting” aspects. To illustrate how different strategic perspectives were involved in developing strategy we will use the AMS’s strategic value chain as shown in Figure 1.
The strategic value chain above exemplifies Ghemawat’s (2002: 71) idea that the team can draw from a “menu” of ideas to practise strategy development. The team produced the strategic value chain, and drew on ideas from all four strategic approaches and IC. First, the idea of a value chain was borrowed from Porter’s value chain analysis. Here key aspects of how the AMS needed to link specific management challenges to specific value based outcomes. In Figure 1 the first four sections of the diagram are identified as strategic inputs and the last two sections as strategic outputs. Thus, by ensuring the first four management challenges or inputs are operationalised the two outputs can be achieved. Value chain analysis is seen as an appropriate strategic concept because the team identified that each of the management challenges is linked and precedes the other. Thus, the AMS could not attract and retain world class students unless they first had world class educators and administrators.

Similarly, aspects of game theory are used to strategise about how to enact the management challenges. For example, AMS needed to attract and retain world class educators and the decision to hire people of this stature is not a decision made lightly by either the AMS or the person being hired. An example of this is irreversible commitment to hire a world leading professor to become the Associate Dean of Research (Dumay et al, 2008: 17). In order to attract this person the AMS had to make a long term commitment to the professor and thus the professor becomes a ‘sticky’ human resource, entrenched at the AMS for a significant period of time. In turn this signals to other music schools that this ‘human resource’ is no longer available and to students that an important ‘human resource’ is entrenched at the AMS. This, in turn, is intended to go towards influencing some world class students to study at the AMS.

The team can also link the RBV approach to strategy to Figure 1 because world class human resources of administrators, educators and students and the associated competences are required to develop world class research and performances (Dumay
et al, 2008: 17–8). For example, in 2008 the AMS funded nine internally funded research projects and set up a taskforce embarking on a project to commission 100 new works for the AMS’s 100th Anniversary in 2015. This also provides a link to the dynamic capabilities framework because these activities are all about developing intangible resources in a highly competitive market for human resources, which adds to the capability of the AMS to produce music.

The strategy team did not lose sight of the financial resources required to deliver these outcomes. As with most universities, programs are not simply funded through student fees and government funding. Most prestigious music schools get some level of funding from benefactors, through fees for concert performances, donations, scholarship funds and/or bequests, and competition for funds on an international basis can be fierce. Thus, by delivering on the three prior management challenges the AMS is better placed to attain funding for current and future programs.

Finally, IC theory is combined with the strategic frameworks to identify and connect key intangible challenges in order to translate these into a set of IC indicators that can be used to track future progress as shown in Figure 2. Again, accounting was not supplanted, because an important aspect of the project was developing budgets to ensure the strategy could be resourced alongside developing and financing the strategy as evidenced by the desire to increase income from student fees.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009 (forecast)</th>
<th>Desirable Trend to 2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of students with faculty scholarships</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Undergraduate students</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Postgraduate students</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income from student fees ($,000)</td>
<td>775</td>
<td>1036</td>
<td>1045</td>
<td>1354</td>
<td>1770</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of international student load</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 2: IC indicators for the challenge of attracting students**

More importantly the purpose of the project was not just to ‘develop’ the strategy, but to understand what needed to be done to implement the strategy. As shown in Figure 3, the team were able to identify on one page the key initiatives required to transform the strategy into action. This last diagram enables the AMS to communicate to staff, students, University management, key benefactors, and the public its strategy and how it will be enacted, thus enabling the *praxis* of strategy to be put into action.
### 5. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

The main focus of this paper was to understand the relationship between IC and different approaches to strategy. The paper demonstrated how the ‘practice’ of developing a strategy in an Australian music school was undertaken using an IC lens. The main contributions of the paper are as follows:

First we not only agree with Whittington’s contention “that strategy is more than just a property of organizations; it is something that people do” but add IC into the same mix. Doing IC is more important than understanding its elements. Thus, we agree with O'Donnell et al (2006: 7) that the big question is “How do you do IC?” rather than “How is IC?”

Second, we have also learned from reflecting on implementing strategy using IC that the work should not be left to a select group of expert IC or ‘strategy practitioners’. This is not to say we do not need expert practitioners well versed in the concepts of IC and/or strategy, but we also need the input of the people who carry out the work of implementing initiatives and living with the impacts of IC and strategy on a day-to-day basis. Thus, this paper contributes to the understanding of strategy as practice by acknowledging that we need to expand from a narrow “set of strategy practitioners”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Attract and Retain World Class Educators and Administrators</strong></th>
<th><strong>Attract and Retain World Class Students by Becoming an Institution of Choice</strong></th>
<th><strong>Develop World Class Research and Performances</strong></th>
<th><strong>Develop Key Benefaction Support for the Conservatorium</strong></th>
<th><strong>Placement of Graduates in Leading Roles in Music Education and in the Music Industry</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- 5 year hiring plan to acquire the best international people possible</td>
<td>- increase the number and quality of scholarships</td>
<td>- 5 year plan commenced to increase research output</td>
<td>- clearly communicate our vision and excitement to our stakeholders</td>
<td>- keep better track of the placement of our students once they leave the Conservatorium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- increase the number of educators with masters and PhD qualifications</td>
<td>- increase the number of postgraduate students</td>
<td>- employment of the Associate Dean of Research</td>
<td>- ensure we are an essential part of a broader Sydney and Australian culture</td>
<td>- publicise the success of our graduates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- develop alternative funding sources</td>
<td>- develop and maintain our infrastructure in line with the standards of a world class institution</td>
<td>- improve the number of research active faculty</td>
<td>- develop master classes and performances by prominent international artists</td>
<td>- develop an alumni database of CV’s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- continue to develop the skills of our people</td>
<td>- continue to evolve our curriculum to meet changing societal demands including e-Learning</td>
<td>- review and formalise the process of measuring research output</td>
<td>- develop our brand, databases and website</td>
<td>- development of alumni events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- international exchange programs for staff</td>
<td></td>
<td>- April 2010 research symposium</td>
<td>- seek corporate sponsorships of events</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![Figure 3: The AMS strategic value chain with key initiatives](#)
(Whittington, 2006: 621) to an expanded group of “strategy participants” who live in the context of their workplace.

Third, it is important to include ‘participants’ when developing strategy and IC because the ability of an organisation to accomplish its goals is predicated by the ability of its people to understand and work towards these goals. Being intimately involved in developing strategy as opposed to ‘dusting off’ 150 plus pages of strategy appears in this case to be more effective towards the actual goal of practising the strategy. In essence, how can one practise IC or strategy if one does not know what it is or how it relates to day-to-day activities? So rather than be concerned with becoming an IC or strategy ‘practitioner’, we should become more concerned with becoming ‘participants’. Participating is doing and including those who ‘do the work’ in developing IC and strategy should better connect strategy to praxis and actions in the workplace.

REFERENCES


